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Klotz: Shooting the War

Shooting the War

The Canadian Army Film Unit
in the Second World War
Sarah Klotz
“The exploits and adventures of these tripod toters, both in and out of actual combat,
will no doubt enliven the pages of more than one book which will be written some
day about World War II.”1
Jon Farrell, Canadian Geographic Journal, June 1945

V

ery little has been written about the Canadian
Army Film Unit (CAFU) since the end of
the Second World War, despite Jon Farrell’s
postulation. There have been a few short
newspaper articles related to the Film Unit and
the D-Day footage that made it famous, but there
has been no scholarly study by either military
or film historians.2 The purpose of the CAFU
was to create an official
audio-visual record
of Canada’s
Army, just as
the official
historians, war
artists, and
photographers
were documenting
other aspects of
the war.3 The Film
Unit started as only a
few men, but expanded s u b s t a n t i a l l y
throughout the war, increasing the scope and
breadth of its productions. The men and women
of the CAFU who operated the cameras, edited
the film, and then distributed the finished
products were different from the civilian war
correspondents and commercial newsreel
cameramen who were also creating a visual
record of the war. The CAFU attached cameramen
to military units and they shot real-time footage
of Canadians in battle. This footage was then
used to create the CAFU films, and formed the
basis of National Film Board of Canada (NFB)
and commercial newsreel company productions.

Most of the existing scholarship exploring
Canadian film and the Second World War focuses
on the NFB and John Grierson, the father of the
documentary in Canada and the NFB’s first film
commissioner.4 The historiography suggests
that the NFB was, for all practical purposes, the
main film institution creating Canadian motion
pictures. This was true, but much of its wartime
film footage came from
the cameras of the
CAFU – footage
that was shot
in harm’s way.
Despite this
neglect by
historians, the
CAFU played
an essential role
in the history of
Canadian film. Much
of what subsequent generations have seen or
know about the Second World War comes from
footage shot by the Film Unit. Yet it is a difficult
story to tell since it must be pieced together
using primary sources, both textual and audiovisual. The Film Unit will receive the credit that
it deserves and will find its place again in the
history of the Second World War.
*****

T

here was no official mandate for securing
Canadian wartime moving images at the
start of the war, but the Public Relations Office,
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formed in 1940 and commanded by Captain
W.G. Abel, obtained or assisted in the recording
of several films relating to the Canadian forces’
activities in the United Kingdom since their
arrival in December 1939.5 The movies were shot
by commercial companies, an improvised film
unit made up of soldiers from the Photographic
Section of the Canadian Corps (later Army)
Headquarters, and British commercial companies
commissioned by the NFB.6 But these groups
worked on an ad hoc basis, and so there were
enormous gaps in the coverage. Furthermore,
they were generally uninterested in most military
issues like training and day-to-day activities. As
a result, the motion pictures they produced were
a patch-work of images, driven by the demands
of entertainment and publicity, and a poor visual
historical record.
Accordingly, in January 1941, LieutenantGeneral Andrew McNaughton, who commanded
the Canadian Corps in the United Kingdom, asked
Major C.P. Stacey, the newly-appointed historical
officer, to report on the value of establishing a
permanent film unit. Stacey recommended the
organisation of a unit of soldier-cameramen
within Public Relations, which would eliminate
the reliance on commercial companies and
ensure “an admirable collection of historical
films dealing with Canadian military activity
in this country.”7 While the earlier commercial
films focused on publicity and entertainment,
Stacey, perhaps not surprisingly, thought the
value of moving images was rooted in their use
as an historical record. McNaughton agreed, and
it was decided that an army film unit would be
established. Unfortunately, nothing was done for
over half a year.
That changed in August 1941 when John
Grierson was quoted in various newspapers that
he was going to run a film unit for the Canadian
Army.8 Grierson had been adept at expanding
his role in the Canadian film industry before the
war, and he clearly had his eyes set on the war
overseas. While the National Film Board Act
(1939) specified that no government department
could produce films without the authority of
the NFB, this was difficult to enforce overseas
and completely ignored by McNaughton. When
Grierson arrived in London that same month,
he met with senior Canadian officers, where
he argued for control over all film work. In one

heated discussion with Lieutenant-General Price
Montague at Canadian Military Headquarters
(CMHQ) in London, Grierson went so far as to
claim that only he, as Film Commissioner, could
approve and direct film activities. Montague did
not take kindly to the idea of a civilian interfering
with the army and Grierson’s claims were
disregarded.9
This was the impetus needed at CMHQ to
establish the film unit, which had been forgotten
in the activity of training and expansion. The
Canadian Army Film Unit was officially formed in
October 1941 to ensure “accurate presentation of
Canada’s war effort.”10 It was to record subjects
suitable for theatrical release in Canada, produce
training films, and document the activities of the
Canadian Army.11 It operated under the Public
Relations Office at CMHQ and, at first, comprised
just two officers and two other ranks.12 They
began to film the overseas units, but were plagued
by faulty equipment and lack of supplies.
A disappointed Grierson returned to
Canada, later acknowledging the authority of
the army to film its own activities.13 However,
Grierson’s well-earned reputation as a master
director ensured that some of his suggestions
for personnel were accepted. George Noble, a
British cameraman with whom Grierson was
familiar, and Michael Spencer, a former NFB
employee, were recommended, becoming two of
the founding members of the CAFU.14 Despite
this seemingly supportive relationship, Grierson
continued to look for ways to wrestle control away
from the Film Unit.
*****

L

ieutenant Jack McDougall, a former
cameraman and director for the Associated
Screen News (ASN), commanded the CAFU. The
ASN, a Canadian film company, would contribute
several additional experienced personnel
to the CAFU. Assisting McDougall were the
aforementioned Noble and Spencer, as well as
Al Grayston, also a former ASN employee.15 All
had cinematographic experience in Canada or
the United Kingdom and were eager to put their
skills to use.
The men of the film unit underwent training
in refresher cinematography courses through
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John Grierson, Film Commissioner,
National Film Board of Canada.

British film schools, but they were also instructed
in regular infantry battle drill.16 Although the
formal film training was useful, nothing could
supplement the shooting experience received
in the field. Before this trial-by-fire, however,
the CAFU practiced its art by covering parades,
training and manoeuvres.17
The soldier-cameramen produced films
almost immediately, and within a month of the
CAFU’s establishment it had fulfilled a number
of NFB requests for footage. It also developed a
plan of future projects.18 Yet the overseas forces,
with the exception of two battalions sent to Hong
Kong in 1941 and a few other garrison units, were
training in England and defending the United
Kingdom against possible German invasion. The
only topics available to the CAFU were training,
non-combat roles, and social activities. And so
these themes were prevalent in early productions.
In an effort to support operational activities
in the army, by early 1942, training films were
being produced. The CAFU developed scripts in
conjunction with training schools, and was then
responsible for securing the required shots.19
Like standardized training manuals, film allowed
the army to ensure that all troops received a
consistent message. Army instructors believed in
the effectiveness of training new recruits through
the replication of battle situations. The CAFU
was asked to shoot mock-battles, but later in
the war some scenes in the training films were
taken from footage of actual battle sequences.20
The main purpose of these motion pictures was
to instruct, and Smoke of Battle (1944), for
instance, was used as a refresher course and to
show experienced troops how to effectively use
smoke screens in combat.21
By enlisting the CAFU to produce these
movies, instead of a civilian company, the army
was able to secure footage that was top secret.22
In the short film, Ronson Flame Thrower (1942),
animated diagrams were used to describe the
physics behind the flame thrower and how it was
built.23 There were also close-ups of different
parts of the equipment and live-action shots of
soldiers using flame throwers in mock battles.
Due to the secret nature of the subject matter, it
would have been risky for a civilian organisation

to produce the film. Already, the militarycontrolled CAFU was proving its value.
The CAFU’s theatrical films also had great
value for the Canadian Army. Through the
production of more than a dozen twenty-minute
motion pictures, the Public Relations Office was
able to propagate a positive view of the army to
both military and civilian audiences in Canada
and abroad. 24 The films were scripted and
sometimes comprised staged footage, paralleling
closely the modern-day documentary. They
received a warm reception internationally.
Wood for War (1941), the first CAFU
theatrical short, documented the work of the
Canadian Forestry Corps in Scotland and
detailed the camaraderie shared between
Canadian lumberjacks and local Scots.25 The
production of Wood for War was followed by
Motorcycle Training (1942). 26 This movie
highlighted the impact of the motorcycle on
the effectiveness of the army through a series
of dramatized sequences, where a dispatch
rider rushed to deliver an important message.
The films, distributed in the British Ministry of
Information weekly series, were both immensely
popular and later dubbed into several foreign
languages. 27 However, international success did
not ensure distribution in Canada. In fact, Wood
for War and Motorcycle Training were never
shown to Canadian audiences. Although the films
were quality productions, the NFB, which was
responsible for the Canadian distribution of the
CAFU films, did not think that the subjects had
a broad enough appeal. The NFB commended
Wood for War but it also claimed it was unable
to support this film as it did not fit with its “own
plan of theatrical distribution.”28 This was just
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The Smoke of Battle film in the making. A film crew looks on as a house is set on fire, Sussex, England, 8 August 1944.

the beginning of the difficulties between the CAFU
and the NFB, and it set the stage for the “war of
wills” that was to play out over the coming years.
Although the NFB and the soldier-cameramen
were intended to work cooperatively with the
former advising the CAFU on the type of material
to be shot, the first correspondence received from
the NFB did not arrive in London until May 1942
– eight months after the Film Unit was formed.
The relationship between the two organizations
had been strained since Grierson’s failed attempt
to gain control over the Film Unit in August 1941.
The poor relationship was a cause of concern for
many in the army, and Major W.G. Abel of the
Public Relations Office was particularly worried
that an unhelpful NFB would be detrimental
to the army’s public image; he tried to find
a compromise: “Lieutenant McDougall is, of
course, familiar with the stuff that you have
required in the past,” Abel wrote to Grierson in
May 1942. “It appears that he is shooting with
that in mind, but precisely the same information
led him to produce ‘Wood for War.’ It would be
a great pity if the material that has been going
forward has not been suitable, and that through
lack of advice corrections were not made.”29
Abel’s intervention did little to ease the tension,
and there were few additional attempts by the
NFB to assist the CAFU in its film-making. But

the NFB’s unwillingness to support the CAFU was
a blessing in disguise, forcing the overseas unit
to develop its own in-house expertise, including
the coordination and distribution of its own
productions to commercial newsreel companies.
*****

I

n the spring of 1942, the 2nd Canadian
Division began training for a raid on Dieppe,
France. Although members of the CAFU were
initially requested to film the action, they were
later denied the opportunity just days before
the operation. Instead, three British cameramen
accompanied the Dieppe expedition and,
consequently, there was no CAFU-produced
film footage of the raid. This was the first
major action by Canadian troops in England in
nearly two years and it was very upsetting to the
soldier-cameramen that they were not allowed to
participate. Aware of the raid’s importance, the
NFB soon requested all of the CAFU’s footage.
The CAFU was in the humiliating position of
having to ask the British War Office for copies of
the film shot by their cameramen.
McDougall was furious that his men had been
denied the opportunity to film the Canadians.
“Where the fault lies I have no way of knowing,
but the fact remains that we had a definite job to
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do, we were trained, prepared and equipped to
do it, and when the time came to do it we were
deliberately ignored,” wrote McDougall. 30 He
asked CMHQ to examine this issue and develop
a policy for operational film coverage. McDougall
also presented an ultimatum: if CMHQ was not
satisfied with the current quality of work then he
would ask to be replaced and transferred back to
combat duties. McDougall’s threat was successful
and he received full support and backing from
both the Public Relations Office and CMHQ in late
August 1942.31 A policy for operational coverage
was soon established.
At the same time, the Dieppe debacle set
off another power struggle between the NFB
and CMHQ for control over the Film Unit. The
footage of the Dieppe raid, accused Grierson,
“was especially poor, lacking not only in the
imaginative approach but also in quality.”
Grierson twisted the dagger, patronizingly
reminding CMHQ that the NFB and the Canadian
public were accustomed to films of a certain class
and “it must, above all, be newsworthy and of
a quality which will enable our various needs
in recruiting, public relations and morale to be
adequately served.” 32
It is difficult to reconstruct precisely the
Dieppe footage that the NFB received, but it is
clear that no cameramen hit the beaches and
so all shots would have been from ships several
kilometres away, thus failing to convey the
immediacy of combat.33 There were scenes of
the air battle, but the majority of this footage was
taken from a distance, and the air craft appear
as little more than dark specks in the sky. The
best footage was shot from planes looking down
on the battlefield, but there was precious few
shots to enliven the long distance footage from
the ships. It is not surprising that when the CAFU
produced its retrospectives on the Dieppe raid
later in the war that the majority of the footage
was German.34
Grierson hoped to use the failed opportunity
at Dieppe to gain control over the CAFU, arguing
in September 1942 that CMHQ should be
responsible only for the policy of the Film Unit,
and that “the National Film Board, should be
given the opportunity to exercise [its] proper
responsibility as its executors.”35 Yet since the
CAFU was not the source of this footage, it was
difficult for Grierson to use this botched coverage

as a reason for control. More importantly, after
running the Film Unit for a year, the army was
not about to hand over the job of documenting
its war to a civilian agency. Abel and McDougall
rallied to the defence, and the NFB’s request for
control was denied; in fact, more personnel were
attached to the Film Unit. This influx of additional
resources enabled the CAFU to produce the
Canadian Army Newsreel, its most popular and
widely viewed film product.
The first Canadian Army Newsreel was
released on 16 November 1942, with all
subsequent productions available on the fifteenth
of every month. The Newsreel contained between
five to ten stories an issue and was composed of
CAFU footage. The newreels were approximately
ten minutes in length with sound and narration,
featuring stories, initially, on sporting events,
inspections, parades, commemoration, training,
and non-combat duties.36 Once the Canadian
Army was involved in active battle, however, the
Newsreel also included combat footage.
These short movies were a source of
entertainment and information for the soldiers.
“The Canadian Army Newsreel has a good
reputation with the troops for unbiased and
unpropagandized news,” testified one report.37 At
the time, the men of CAFU did not consider their
work on the Newsreel as propaganda, as their
primary role was to document the army. But since
the films were edited and scripted, there would
certainly be a bias – the Allies were trying to win
a war and would do whatever they needed to win,
including building the morale of the soldiers by
carefully edited footage.38 For example, in the
earliest Newsreel production on the Dieppe
raid, Dieppe Heroes Honoured (1942), the CAFU
focused primarily on the commemoration of
the raid.39 The story recorded Dieppe veterans
receiving awards at Buckingham Palace and there
was little mention as to what happened during
the raid or of those who never returned. From
this newsreel alone, one might imagine it was a
victorious operation.
The newsreels were distributed through
the Auxiliary Services as part of the regular
recreational program.40 “Each issue has been
very warmly greeted by the troops,” noted
McDougall, they “seem to want as much of this
sort of thing as we can give them.”41 Initially,
it was only possible to show the newsreel to
25
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soldiers stationed in Britain, but, by the end of
1943, the Auxiliary Services requested that the
Newsreel be presented wherever the Canadian
Army was posted or fighting.42 The Newsreel was
also available to soldiers in Canada through the
Public Relations Office.
In early 1943, a special War Establishment was
approved to increase the number of cameramen
in order to more fully cover future operations. 43
This expansion created a small editing team and
a field unit for operational coverage. The No. 1
Film Unit was composed of three cameramen,
one officer and two other ranks. It was attached
to Divisional Headquarters, but it would travel
between brigades or battalions, shooting the
army’s activities.

The CAFU’s first entry into battle occurred
at Sicily when the No. 1 Film Unit landed with
the first assault wave on 10 July 1943.47 The
landings were lightly contested, and Sergeant
Alan Grayston filmed the early morning activities,
getting some of the best footage, including shots
of Canadians charging up the beaches and
breaking down wire barricades. Lieutenant Al
Fraser also filmed the landing, focusing on a
group of “knocked out guns,” before moving
on to a captured airfield to record prisoners.48
The 1st Division, with the Film Unit following,
pushed the enemy back in what became a hot,
dusty, and nasty campaign. Almost immediately,
Fraser arranged for the unit’s precious footage
to be sent back to London for
censorship and editing. The
transfer of material was usually
done by plane in order to ensure
that the footage arrived within a
day or two of being shot.
Photo by Strathy Smith, Library and Archives Canada PA 140098

The officer of the Film Unit was the primary
point of contact for the brigade and it was
essential for him to be kept abreast of any action.
“They should not be regarded as interfering
“press” representatives, but as front line soldiers,
performing a very necessary military duty,”
opined one optimistic report.44 And this was
generally the case, as most soldiers supported the
CAFU’s activities. The cameramen were attached

to various operational units to document their
actions and usually attended briefing sessions
for upcoming engagements. Forewarned of the
next operation, the men of the CAFU took their
position near the front and waited for the battle
to begin. They were well within range of sniper,
artillery, and mortar fire.45 The cameramen
spent most of their time preparing for the
battle, realizing that they would have very little
opportunity to capture the actual chaos of war
on film.46

26
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Each soldier-cameraman
was supplied with a portable
camera, usually the Bell and
Howell Eyemo, a lightweight
metal tripod, and 900 to 3,000
feet of film (thirty to ninety
minutes) that was carried in
pouches on the front and back
much like soldiers carrying
ammunition.49 They were also
equipped with a pistol and a
knife. The members of the Film
Unit considered themselves as
part of the fighting force and
often volunteered to assist units
in battle, including putting down
cameras and picking up rifles.
Film Unit movie camera mounted on
the turret of a Sherman tank, 23 May
1944 in the vicinity of the Hitler Line,
Italy.

6

Klotz: Shooting the War

The Film Unit did not create any theatrical
films from the footage shot in Sicily, but a number
of Newsreels carried their footage. 50 While
Canadian Army Newsreel No. 13 – Sicily (1943)
presented the crossing and assault landing, the
next issue focused on the Canadians’ battle for
Leonforte and Agira. The film showed heavy
combat with tanks advancing and the Canadians
encountering German mortar fire outside of
Leonforte. The battle was characterized by
fierce street fighting, but the cameramen were
unable to record the action. Instead, the editing
team in London used other available footage,
like the shots of Leonforte destroyed after the
battle, to create the Newsreel story. 51 The film
also documented the fight for Agira at the end of
July 1943. Unfortunately, the operation began
before daybreak, so the light was not ideal
for a well-exposed shot. Although they were
working in difficult conditions, to say nothing
of filming under enemy fire, the cameramen
were resourceful. For instance, as the artillery
shells were fired from the Canadian guns,
the muzzle flash lit the surrounding area and
created a ghostly and powerful image of battle.
The quality of the footage was improving and the
Sicilian campaign was very successful for the
Film Unit. Yet the Sicily battles also proved that
a cameraman could not record everything, and
even when in position it was difficult to get good
shots due to light, fragile equipment, and enemy
fire.
*****

W

hile the Canadians were capturing unique
footage on the battlefield, an administrative
battle continued to rage over control of the CAFU.
Although Grierson’s last attempt to envelop the
Film Unit was unsuccessful, his complaints
continued, as did his lack of cooperation in
distributing the CAFU productions. The NFB
charged that the Film Unit was full of amateurs,
lacking the creative talents of NFB directors and
cameramen. Yet nothing could be further from the
truth. The majority of the CAFU personnel had
prewar cinematographic experience, be it with
the NFB, ASN, or other broadcasting agencies.
This, coupled with their military training,
made them a good fit for a unit that required
its personnel to negotiate film techniques and
artistic construction, as well as be accepted as
equals by the troops who they were to accompany
into battle.

In an attempt to bridge the perceived
artistic gap between the NFB and the CAFU,
the Public Relations Office again tried to find a
compromise, suggesting that Gordon Sparling be
attached to the CAFU to head up its production
activities in London.52 Sparling was a veteran
film-maker of the ASN and it was thought that
an individual possessing his experience would
assuage Grierson. When Grierson heard of the
recommendation, he reacted poorly, attempting
to block Sparling’s attachment to the CAFU under
the pretence that the ASN could not afford to lose
a man of such experience. Grierson, it seemed,
was trying to starve the CAFU of experienced
film-makers. “When I took leave of my employer
at Associated Screen, he was most sceptical that
‘the army unit was anything more than two men
and a boy,’” wrote Sparling. “This was, I found,
typical of the general impression in Canada.”53
The CAFU had earned a strong reputation among
senior officers at CMHQ and the fighting men
in the field, but their work had not yet been
recognized across the Atlantic.
*****

J

ohn McDougall, now promoted to Captain,
commanded the Film Unit in the field
while Sparling took charge over the London
headquarters. McDougall and three men set out
for Italy in September 1943. The Film Unit faced
difficulties prior to landing as a U-Boat sank the
ship upon which they were travelling. No one
from the CAFU was hurt, but McDougall risked
his life to save the one camera that was aboard;
its destruction would have resulted in a serious
delay in documenting the Canadians in battle.
The Film Unit was in Italy for four months
before it was combined with the Photo Unit,
forming the Canadian Film and Photo Unit
(CFPU). While both the still and movie cameramen
documented the Canadians in several battles, it
was at Ortona in December 1943 where the
unit solidified its reputation.54 Ortona was an
important anchor along the German defensive
line, and it would not be relinquished lightly. The
enemy had fortified the town, bombing streets
and demolishing buildings to force the Canadian
infantry into open squares where they would be
easy targets for snipers.55 To avoid these killing
grounds, the Canadians pioneered “mouse-holing”
tactics – attacking from building to building by
blowing holes in adjoining walls, allowing them
27
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The Ortona footage reflected the brutal
nature of the fighting. Battle of Ortona (1943)
included the first images of dead soldiers in
the Newsreel and the first image of a Canadian
soldier wounded in action, though his injury was
not severe. Canadians were recorded sorting
out the German dead and digging their graves,
giving them “a decent burial.” The film then
moved on to show the rows and rows of German
dead lying on the ground and then cut to a shot
of Canadians marching towards Ortona. The
last image was of a close-up of a dead German
soldier with a gruesome head wound, the
narration identifying the body as “one of Hitler’s
soldiers… with a picture of his Fuhrer beside
him.”59 Notwithstanding the earlier difficulties of
capturing combat on film, the CFPU coverage of
the battle for Ortona resulted in superb footage.
The intensity of the fighting could only have been
captured by cameramen at the front. Although
the newsreel’s message highlighted the German
defeat, there was no denying – or hiding – the
difficult battlefield conditions.
The Ortona material was well received by
the commercial newsreel companies, and was
shown throughout North America. “Unit deserves
highest praise,” cabled Sparling.60 The men of the
Film Unit even heard back from their families at

home, who had seen the footage, and at least one
cameraman’s parents wrote worriedly about their
son’s safety as he filmed the sharp end of war.61

Photo by Frederick R. Whitcombe, Library and Archives Canada PA 147111

to stay inside and avoid most of the snipers.56
While this tactic protected soldiers, it added to
the difficulty of filming combat. The cameramen
were thus forced to make choices relating to
subject matter, not based upon importance
but more on proximity, safety, and sometimes
courageous opportunity. But the cameramen
were tenacious. Sergeant Jack Stollery was
with the tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment as
they made their way through the battle-ravaged
streets. The tanks came under German fire and
their advance was halted. “Stollery was unable
to cover the action from where he was so he
pushed ahead for another hundred yards with
camera and tripod, and calmly photographed
the little battle which developed,” recounted one
after-battle report. His actions “so surprised the
commander of the leading tank that he opened up
the hatch of his tank and took a picture himself
with his own camera.”57 Stollery was awarded the
Military Medal and his citation read, in part: “His
appearance with the forward troops in moments
of great danger…was in no small way responsible
for bolstering their morale.”58

From their experiences in Sicily and Italy,
the soldiers of the CFPU knew that camera work
was very different when trying to stay alive on the
battlefield. McDougall recounted that “one of the
miracles of the last six months is the fact that we
haven’t had a casualty yet. Our lads have been
right up with the most forward troops day after
day,” and that “everyone has his own collection
of near misses.”62 The CFPU did not remain this
lucky: a still photographer was killed and two
cameramen were wounded seriously in January
1944.
Attached to different operational units to
ensure the fullest coverage, the cameramen
were isolated from one another, and thus had a
tremendous amount of independence to decide
what to capture on film.63 Although they had
freedom to shoot what they wished, there was
always a question of self-censorship. No formal
policy existed on filming sensitive subjects,
such as showing dead Canadian soldiers, but
according to oral testimonies and existing
footage, very few of the cameramen recorded
these grim events. Dead and maimed Canadians
would have signalled a defeat or setback and
were not fitting content for other soldiers or
those on the home front.64 At the same time, to
leave them out reduced the effectiveness of their
film as a documentary tool. These two conflicting
goals were not easy to negotiate, but in this case
sensibilities overruled the desire to show all
aspects of the war.
Although self-censorship occurred, the men
of the Film Unit drew the line at representing
fabricated scenes as factual accounts. Since the
CFPU’s main function was to document Canadian
activities, “uncompromising truthfulness was
decided upon. Re-enactment could easily become
the thin edge of the wedge whereby the historical
and record value would be completely sacrificed
to propaganda, and cheap heroics.”65 This meant
that every day of shooting would not always result
in useable footage. If the operational unit to which
the cameramen were attached was not involved
in any major battles, there might not be much to
Opposite: Sergeant George A. Game, CAFU, filming on
the outskirts of San Leonardo di Ortona, Italy, 10 December
1944.
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see or capture on film. Conversely, sometimes the
battles were not conducive to recording footage;
the CFPU’s cameramen, at one point in Italy, were
caught in three days of shelling with the Royal 22e
Régiment, but due to these deadly conditions they
were unable to record much useful footage. Al
Fraser of the No. 1 Film Unit explained the unit’s
difficulties: critics “seem to think that we can
manufacture an Ortona every day of the week, you
know this isn’t possible, and thank goodness [it]
is not possible, if the pix [sic] from here have not

seemed very news-worthy, it is due to the plain
fact that there just isn’t any news at present.”66 Yet
much of this unnewsworthy footage was essential
for documenting the daily life of the Canadian
Army and was used in the Newsreels.
Despite the success of the CFPU, the
relationship between it and the NFB continued
to worsen, with Grierson making a final attempt
to gain control in March 1944. Grierson was
anxious to improve the overall quality of the
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Film Unit recording an attack by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in Normandy, 8 August 1944.

CFPU films and, in his new role as head of
the Wartime Information Board, he mobilized
his resources and contacts with the media.
“Whenever Grierson invades this country there
is always some advance notice of his coming,”
remarked Abel.67 Grierson never made it to
London, but the intent of his visit was mentioned
in the May 1944 issue of Maclean’s magazine.
Grierson, it was reported, had planned the trip
because of his dissatisfaction with the CFPU
footage: “lately the Army photographers have
been sending back too few battle pictures, too
many studies of Brass Hats.”68 By denigrating
the reputation of the CFPU, it appeared that
Grierson was hoping to again manoeuvre for
control. Sparling was understandably furious,
“it makes surprising reading for the rest of the
army who are thus informed that CFPU personnel
are only ‘uniformed photographers’ (similar to
civilian war correspondents) rather than soldiers
assigned to special duties.” 69 The good work of
the CFPU, which had continued to support the
army with training films and publicity material,
allowed Abel to appeal to his superiors:
A continuous check over a period of years
indicates that we have had a lack of support
which some of our very excellent films have not
deserved, and it would seem strange to us now
that having failed so far to obtain cooperation,

the very organisation on whom we had relied,
should be given direction and disposition of our
future material.70

The ongoing lack of NFB support was
enough to thwart Grierson’s take-over bid,
but control over Canadian film productions
was also changing in preparation for the
invasion of Northwest Europe. The Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF) was now responsible for, among other
things, the coordination of all publicity services
in Europe, including film and photography.71 It
would have been nearly impossible to integrate a
civilian body like the NFB into this multi-national
military structure, especially with Canada as
a junior partner. The Public Relations Office
felt that the new arrangement through SHAEF
would only improve the distribution of the
CFPU’s military films, with Abel concluding that
“we will probably get into the Canadian theatre
much more frequently than we ever did through
the cooperation of the Film Board.”72 As well,
with SHAEF taking the lead on distribution,
Canadian footage would now be shown to a larger
international audience. This was the last salvo in
Opposite: The Allied bombing of Cap Gris Nez being
captured on film, 26 September 1944.
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the Grierson’s battle for control of overseas film.
Soon after these arrangements were made, the
CFPU proved itself again as a professional force.
*****

I

n February 1944, John McDougall, with the
No. 1 Film Unit in Italy, was called back to
England to organize a second field unit for the
forthcoming operations in Northwest Europe.73
By June 1944, there were close to 200 people
attached to the CFPU, with most responsible for
the transfer, editing, and creation of the films
at the London headquarters. 74 Although there
had been some good footage from the Italian
campaign, the professional reputation of the
CFPU was solidified on 6 June 1944, as it was
responsible for the first footage and stills of
D-Day landings to reach the public anywhere in
the Allied world.
The Canadians laid claim to having the first
Allied cameraman on French soil. Sergeant Dave

Reynolds of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion
jumped into France in the early hours of 6 June,
but like so many of the paratroops his drop was
scattered and he missed his landing point. More
detrimental, his camera was lost, torn from his
body during the descent. Although Reynolds was
unable to record any footage, he joined up with
a unit of British paratroops who were advancing
on a group of enemy defended houses. Attesting
to his combat training, he led a section into a
house, clearing the building, killing three German
soldiers.75 Cameramen were responsible for
shooting the war on film and, when necessary,
Axis soldiers.
At Juno Beach, Sergeant Bill Grant came
ashore safely with Lieutenant Frank Duberville, a
still photographer. They filmed the fierce fighting,
watchful for any landing crafts that would be
able to transport their motion pictures and stills
back to London. Grant’s film of the landing was
the first to arrive in London, beating all other
footage by six hours. Of the 700 feet of film,
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the censor passed
by Canucks,” and
400 feet, which was
other laudatory
sent off immediately
newspaper headto the commercial
lines served as
newsreels. Grant’s
great publicity for
powerful footage
the CFPU and the
was shot from
Canadian Army.79
the landing craft
At the end of
behind the soldiers
June 1944, John
and captured the
McDougall and
men huddled
the No. 2 Film
together, waiting to
Unit arrived in
disembark. 76 The
Normandy. Caen fell
ramp of the craft fell
on 10 July and the
away to reveal dark,
next day McDougall
fortified houses on
and Grayston began
the French coast.
work on You Can’t
The infantry then
Kill a City (1944), a
advanced into the
documentary based
water, making their
on the destruction
way to the beach
and reconstruction
while under heavy
of the city. 80 This
enemy fire. This
Images from the film shot by
was the first Allied
experience of battle
Sergeant Bill Grant on D-Day.
scripted motion
was captured on
picture recorded on
film and remains some of the most poignant
a battlefield. As they shot the film, the Germans,
footage of the war. 77
who were just on the other side of the river, were
firing mortar shells into the city. The film was
Grant’s D-Day film was featured in all the
released later that same year internationally
British Empire newsreels. It was also the first
by the British Ministry of Information and was
footage to reach North America, beating the
translated into several languages. Even the NFB,
others by a day. Yet the Canadian D-Day film
which had not been in contact with the CFPU for
footage was praised not only because it was
months, distributed the film in Canada.81 The
received first, but also because of its quality. Even
relationship improved between the CFPU and
after the American footage was distributed, the
the NFB after the invasion of France, and likely
CFPU was still considered to have shot the best
because of the unit’s celebrated work on D-Day.
battle scenes. McDougall described the reception
Grierson even paid a visit to the Film Unit in the
of this material in a SHAEF pre-screening
summer of 1944, later stating in a CBC radio
theatre:
show that the men of CFPU “are fine soldiers,
The theatre was packed with a lot of senior
and up there where any other man will go.”82
American officers, the censors[,] and our own
He further credited the Film Unit by saying that
representatives. We sat through about three
“no one should think as they see the newsreels
or four thousand feet of rather dull American
of Canada Carries On or World in Action, or
stuff, having to do mainly with preparations and
embarkation. Then came Grant’s stuff. And it
listen to CBC news reports, or read the stories
was good. It was bloody good. All through the
of the Canadian war correspondents, that any
theatre you could hear people whispering to
of it is done without danger and without great
each other and muttering as good shot followed
determination.”83 The relationship between the
good shot. When it was all over there was much
NFB and CFPU had indeed changed.
excitement and planning on how to get it to
Washington the quickest possible way.78

A similar reception was received in Canada
and the United States. “Invasion Pictures Scoop

The Canadian Army continued to push back
the German forces in the summer of 1944 and
the CFPU was there to capture it on film. But
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This famous image of Major David Currie (holding pistol at left) at St. Lambert-sur-Dives was captured by still and
motion picture cameras. It has been described by historian C.P. Stacey as the closest “we are ever likely to come to a
photograph of a man winning the Victoria Cross.” The cameraman on the left is often cropped out of this photograph.

it was difficult work, and the cameramen were
often caught up in the fighting. The 5th Brigade’s
19 July 1944 attack at Fleury-sur-Orne became
disorganized when one of the advancing units, Le
Regiment de Maisonneuve, failed to coordinate its
attack with the supporting barrage.84 The Film
Unit got mixed into this confusion and arrived in
Fleury-sur-Orne with the advance troops. During
the battle, a number of Germans surrendered
to the cameramen. Within minutes, though, an
artillery barrage hit their position and all, captors
and captives alike, dove for cover. When the
intense barrage was finished, the Film Unit was
left with three prisoners, the rest had escaped
or been killed.85 Having survived the attack at
Fleury-sur-Orne, cameraman Jimmie Campbell
was killed the next day, while recording the
Canadians in action.86 “There was no question of
him missing a good shot just because the Jerry
fire was heavy,” reported a radio broadcast. “In
fact, the heavier the fire, greater the action, the
nearer he’d crawl with his camera.” 87 The two

reels of film he shot were sent to London, and
when developed, they included fierce combat
footage.88
During the battle for the Scheldt Estuary
(September to November 1944), Sergeant Lloyd
Millon attached a camera to an assault craft in
order to obtain moving images of the infantry
as they raced into battle. The cameramen
were improving their filming techniques but
Millon did not live to see the results, as he was
killed during the operation.89 The strain of war
continually interfered with the ability of the
combat cameramen to film Canadian actions.
During the fierce fighting at the Leopold canal, the
Film Unit was unable to provide comprehensive
coverage, since again, a camera was damaged,
and Sergeant George Cooper was forced to
watch helplessly as the Canadians stormed the
positions. Yet even if Cooper had a camera, the
water-logged attritional fighting would have been
difficult to shoot, since mobility was greatly
33
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reduced in the porridge-like conditions. Even
when footage was captured, it still had to make it
through the war zone to the London offices. After
filming on the beach at Westkapelle, Sergeant Ken
Dougan stored his equipment and footage in a
landing craft overnight. The craft was sunk in the
evening by artillery fire and his equipment and
footage were lost. Such were the trials of filming
the war.
The No. 1 Film Unit was ordered to Northwest
Europe in early 1945 after a long and difficult
tour of duty in the Italian theatre. Upon its
arrival, the two field units were combined to
provide better coverage of the Canadian Army.90
The Film Unit focused primarily on the Canadian
divisions that were operating in Northern Holland
and Western Germany. The difficult battlefield
conditions continued to plague the cameramen,
and the censors restricted all images of flooded
areas so that the Germans would not know the
extent of the military difficulties. Yet still the Film
Unit documented these campaigns, including
the joyous liberation of civilians, and was even
present for the final surrender of the German
armies in early May 1945.91 Attesting to the
danger of shooting the war from the front lines,
the CFPU had a casualty rate of approximately
ten percent.92 Only four of the original twelve
sergeants were left in the Film Unit by war’s end:

Sergeant Margaret King at work on an editing machine in
the film library of the Canadian Army Film Unit, London,
England, 19 December 1944.

three cameramen had been killed and eighteen
were wounded. The CFPU had truly filmed the
sharp end of war. 93
*****

T

he Canadian Army Film Unit was established
in 1941 with four men, “one old NewmanSinclair camera and one Eyemo camera, one
table, two chairs and an empty film tin used
as an ashtray.”94 It evolved into a professional
unit of close to 200 men and women, who were
responsible for the popular Canadian Army
Newsreel, internationally-distributed theatrical
pieces, and poignant footage, including the
incredible D-Day landing film. Although there
were power struggles with the NFB over the overall
film quality and alleged non-professionalism
of its staff, the soldier-cameramen’s main
responsibility was to create an audio-visual
record of the Army’s activities in the Second
World War. And in this they succeeded.
Jon Farrell’s 1945 comment on the inclusion
of the Film Unit in the histories of the Second
World War seemed at the time to be a certainty.
But for the cameramen who risked their lives to
document the war for Canadians, there are but
few and fleeting references in military history or
film study historiography to their deeds. This
is all the more surprising since the CFPU left
such a strong visual and textual record of its
experiences. The moving images captured by
the men of the CFPU have persisted in the postwar construction of memory through the use
and re-use of this footage in countless modern
documentaries. Despite this historical legacy,
most historians who have explored Canadian film
in the Second World War remain focused on the
NFB, ignoring or wrongly assigning how wartime
footage was shot and processed overseas. Yet
perhaps more important than “enliven[ing] the
pages of more than one book,” it is hoped that
now, sixty years later, proper tribute has been
given to the CFPU, and its long and difficult battle
to document the Canadian Army in the Second
World War.

34
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol14/iss3/3

14

Klotz: Shooting the War

Documentary War Film on the Web

F

ilm documented the
Canadian war effort in
both the First and Second
World Wars. Though many
of these films and newsreels
are hidden away in archives,
they are increasingly being
made available to a wider
audience through the Internet.
Researchers can find these
films on three websites in
particular: the National Film
Board, Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC), and the
Library and Archives Canada.

National Film Board of
Canada

The National Film Board site
<www.nfb.ca/ww1> showcases
“Images of a Forgotten
War - Films of the Canadian
Expeditionary Force in the
Great War.” Here, one can find
upwards of 25 short films about
the Canadian Expeditionary
Force (CEF) ranging in length
from only a couple of minutes to
ten or twelve minutes. The films
are divided into two sections:
“Building a Force” and “War
Time.” Under the “War Time”
section are films about the
battles for Arras and Vimy Ridge.
There are also films relating to
the Hundred Days campaign,
including the battle of Amiens
and the Drocourt-Quéant Line.
Other films ranging from artillery
to gas warfare, from wartime
medicine to the forestry corps,
offer a glimpse into the varied
wartime experiences of the CEF.
In addition to the films, one can
find “Pieces of History,” a section
that provides 1000-word essays
by historians to support the film
footage, including essays on
medicine, the air war, and life
in the trenches. There is also

a series of still photographs to
further complement the audiovisual record.
Library and Archives Canada

A silent newsreel, “Canadians
Capture Vimy Ridge,” can
be found on the Library and
Archives Canada (LAC)
web page “Canada and
the First World War” (http://
www.collectionscanada.ca/
firstworldwar/index-e.html). Click
on “We Were There” and then
“Donald Fraser” to find the video.
The LAC website also
contains a virtual exhibition on
the disastrous Dieppe Raid
of August 1942. “Through a
Lens: Dieppe in Photography &
Film” (www.collectionscanada.
ca/dieppe/index-e.html),
developed by Sarah Klotz,
presents Canadian and German
army newsreels. The German
newsreels allow one to observe
the raid’s grim aftermath. The
first newsreel is narrated in
German while the second, a
propaganda piece aimed for
occupied countries, is narrated
in Dutch (with English subtitles).
While the German newsreels
are superior in quality, the
Canadian newsreels on this site
present some moving images
from after the raid, including
the presentation of awards to
Canadian soldiers and a victory
parade through Dieppe in 1944.
Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation

On the CBC website <www.
cbc.ca/news/background/
ortona> one can find numerous
newsreels about the battle for
Ortona, as well as more general
footage of the Sicilian and

the Italian campaigns. There
are four newsreels relating
to Ortona, including a sevenminute film simply titled “Battle
of Ortona.” There is also a film
of the Seaforth Highlanders
honouring their dead and
one of General H.D.G. Crerar
inspecting his soldiers after
the Battle of Ortona. “Sicily
Snapshots” includes footage
of training drills and Canadian
Engineers building roads. The
“Battle of San Leonardo” offers
a glimpse into the harsh fighting
of the Canadians before Ortona.
In addition to the newsreels
found on the CBC website there
are also a number of radio
broadcasts from Sicily and Italy
by CBC correspondent Matthew
Halton.
Other Websites

Film footage of the Canadians
landing at Normandy is also
available to the general public.
On the Shooters web page
<http://www.jamesoregan.com/
Shooters/>, one can find the
famous 17-second D-Day film of
the Canadians landing on Juno
Beach. It remains one of the
most poignant films ever shot of
Canadians in battle.
By providing authentic
footage from both World
Wars, these websites allow
all Canadians to glimpse the
experience of battle. The films
on these websites are an
essential tool in telling the story
of the Canadian Army.
Brandey Barton is completing her
Masters of Arts degree in History at
Wilfrid Laurier University
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